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VALIDITY OF WAR LABOR BOARD ORDERS

OF
UNION SECURITY AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
UNDER
THE WAR LABOR DISPUTES ACTt
REYNOLDS C. SEITZ

When the War Labor Disputes Act was passed by Congress
on June 25, 1943, the functions of the War Labor Board were
for the first time defined by law, and the Board no longer acted
solely by reason of Executive Order. It appeared that those who
would contest WLB power and authority would no longer be confronted by the obstacle of Pennsylvania R. Co. v United States
Labor Board,1 with its doctrine that plaintiff had no right m
court when a board only had directory power.
Such an- existing situation furnished the impetus for this
article. The present discussion will have as its purpose to analyze
the power and authority of the WLB to act under the War Labor
Disputes Act by issuing orders for maintenance of Union membership and compulsory arbitration.

t The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
They should not be attributed to his present or past employers.
*A.B., 1929, Notre Dame University- A.M., 1932, Northwestern
University* LL.B., 1935, The Creighton University, Professor of Law,
The Creighton University 1938-41, Senior Attorney Review Division,
National Labor Relations Board, 1941-42; Professor of Business Law,
The Municipal University of Omaha, 1942-43; Attorney, Montgomery
Ward & Company Chicago, 1943; Executive, The Chicago Daily News;
frequent contributor to legal periodicals; admitted to practice in
Nebraska in 1935.
1261 U. S. 72, 45 Sup. Ct. 278. Even a contention that the Act inposes no penalties should be overcome by the appealing logic expressed
in Holcombe v Creamer et al, 120 N.E. 354 (Mass.) where the court
remarked, "The coercion resulting from legislation, in form not compulsory may in practice be so severe as to leave no alternative save
compliance. In such a case its validity would depend not upon its
form but its substance." It should not be difficult to demonstrate that
under the War Labor Disputes Act the President exercises a most
real and dangerous compulsion. See also Shields v Utah-Idaho Central
R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 59 Sup. Ct. 160, which appears conclusive on the
right to get into court under the War Labor Disputes Act.
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The logical starting point in any investigation into WLB
power under the War Labor Disputes Act is an inspection of the
Act with the view of ascertaining the sufficiency of standards set
up by Congress to support the delegation. If Congress has not
delegated power under sufficiently detailed and clear standards,
the War Labor Disputes Act is unconstitutional, and hence would
give no power to the WLB.
Section 7(a) (2) of the War Labor Disputes Act is the one
purporting to give the WLB power and duties. It provides as
follows
"To decide the dispute, and provide by order the wages and hours
and all other terms and conditions (customarily included in collectivebargaining agreements) governing the relations between the parties,
which shall be in effect until further order of the Board. In making any
such decision the Board shall conform to the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended; the National Labor Relations
Act; the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended; and the
Act of October 2, 1942 as amended, and all other applicable provisions
of law, and where no other law is applicable the order of the Board shall
provide for terms and conditions to govern relations between the
parties which shall be fair and equitable to employer and employee
under all the circumstances of the case."

A study of Section 7 (a) (2) reveals that the WLB shall decide the dispute and provide by order the wages and hours and
all other terms and conditions customarily included in collective
bargaining agreements under standards which, when broken
down, indicate that in making such decision the Board shall conform to
1. Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended.
2. Provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
3. Provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as
amended.
4. Provisions of the Act of October 2, 1942, as amended.
5. All other applicable provisions of law.
6. Where no other law is applicable to provide for terms and
conditions to govern relations between the parties which shall be
fair and equitable to the employer and employee under all the circumstances of the case.

An argument that Congress has delegated*away its power
improperly is likely to be based upon the premise that the WLB
has been given almost unlimited discretion by virtue of the provision of Section 7(a) (2) that "where no other law is applicable
(the Board) is to provide for terms and conditions to govern
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relations between the parties which shall be fair and equitable to
the employer and employee under all circumstances of the case."
The Board has often exercised this discretion in issuing its orders.
Since the other enumerated standards of Section 7(a) (2) do not
afford a guide, the Board has issued under the "fair and eqitable" standard such a significant order as that providing for
compulsory arbitration. So, too, since the Board contends that
there is no standard in Section 7 (a) (2) which prohibits the issuance of a "maintenance of membership" order, the Board is
assuming to exercise discretion under the "fair and equitable"
clause.
The vital significance of the W-LB issuing compulsory arbitration and maintenance of membership orders under the "fair
and equitable" standard can be portrayed by reasoning of the
following nature.
An order of compulsory arbitration changes a fundamental
American theory that the owner of property has a right to its
possession, the right to manage it for his own use and enjoyment,
and the right to make legal contracts concerning it. These rights
of ownership were subject only to the duty not to use the propertv
so as to unnecessarily injure others, and to the government's
power of eminent domain, taxation, and exercise of police power.
An order of compulsory arbitration does something that Congress
has never done. Congress has recognized that it is the policy of
our government to favor negotiation rather than compulsion of
agreements. Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act,
which fortified the workers' liberty of contract by guaranteeing
them the right to bargain collectively However, Congress did not
attempt to compel an agreement. The parties were left to their
own negotiations. An order of compulsory arbitration prescribes
something which the Supreme Court frowned upon when it said
"The system of compulsory arbitration which the (Kansas) Act
establishes is intended to compel, and if sustained will compel, the
owner and employees to continue the business on terms which are not
of their making
Such a system infringes the liberty of contract and
rights of property guaranteed by the due process of law clause of the
14th Amendment."'

An order of maintenance of membership is the starting phase
which inevitably leads to the full closed shop and a labor mo"Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U. S.
552, 45 Sup. Ct. 441.
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nopoly The maintenance of membership clause means that the
plaintiff must discharge every union member who fails to maintain his unon membership in good standing. It denies to citizens
who are qualified as workers but who elect not to continue union
membership their freedom of contracting with the plaintiff concermnng their labor. An order of maintenance of membership
impairs a fundamental liberty The granting of maintenance of
membership is destroying the laws constitutionally enacted by
Congress. The National Labor Relations Act endorses, guar
antees, and encourages the process of collective bargaining. The
orders of maintenance of membership have led the unions to abandon collective bargaining because of the conviction that the Irar
Labor Board will grant more than it could obtain through collective bargaining.
By way of concluding argument ii an effort to establish im-

proper delegation of power by Congress, it can be submitted that
WLB orders of compulsory arbitration and maintenance of membership effect far reaching and important changes and regulations of private business under the loosest possible standards.
The logic behind such reasoning is so persuasive as to demand
thoughtful reflection. Such reflection suggests a review of the
attitude of the courts toward Congressional delegation of power.
Certain trends have manifested themselves. Because of the
need for definite, unhampered action, the courts have usually sustained the wide discretion which has been delegated to administration in the area of public health, safety and morals cases.3 In
the area of foreign relations the courts have permitted delegation
under broad standards. 4 So, too, in the field of monopolies and
Butterfield v Strannahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, involving provisions for tea inspection; Douglas v Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 43
Sup. Ct. 303, involving the issuance of licenses by a board of dental
examiners; Mutual Film Company v Industrial Commission of Ohio,
236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, involving the censorship of moving
picture films; Commonwealth v Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N.E. 619,
involving protection of fish; Blue v Beach, 154 Ind. 155, 56 N.E. 89,
involving health board power in respect to vaccinations; Hurst v.
Warner, 102 Mich. 238, 60 N.W 440, involving health board power
to make rules for disinfection of baggage; State v Norman, 75 N.H.
541, 84 Atl. 899, involving pure food regulations; and Liggett Drug
Co. v Board of License Comm. of City of North Adams, 296 Mass.
41, 4 N.E. (2d) 628, involving regulation pertammg to running an
eating house.
'Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 29
Sup. Ct. 671, involving regulation of immigration; Mahler v Eby, 264
U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283, involving regulation of immigration.
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business affected with a public interest, the courts have permitted
loose standards to support the delegation of power.5 Broad
standards have been upheld in cases in which the courts have read
into statutes a common law meaning,6 or an understanding and
experience of trades and professions. 7 However, in the field of
commercial transactions, private business, as distinguished from
business affected with a public interest, the courts have required
Congress to delegate power under definite and clear standards.
In PanamaRefining Co. v Ryan s a case involving a regulation of
the oil industry under the Petroleum Code of the National Industrial Recovery Act, the court struck down the delegation of power
in Section 9 (c) by stating
"The Congress left the matter to the President without standard or
rule to be dealt with as he pleased. The effort by ingenious and diligent
construction to supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the President the functions of
a legislative rather than those of an executive or administrative
officer executing a declared legislative policy"

Again in the famous case of Schechter Poultry Corporationet al.
v United States," the court struck down the National Industrial
Recovery Act on the ground of the inadequacy of delegation of
legislative power. Private business was being regulated, and the
court remarked
"We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the
national Legislature cannot deal directly We pointed out in the Panama Refining Company case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying
down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed
limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared
by the Legislature is to apply But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide
range of administrative authority which has been developed by means
'State of Colorado v United States, 271 U. S. 153, 46 Sup Ct.
452; Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. v United States, 283 U. S. 35, 51 Sup. Ct.
337, both involving power of Interstate Commerce Commission; Stafford v Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, involving regulation of
stockyards; Federal Radio Commission v Nelson Bros. Bond and
Mtge. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 53 Sup. Ct. 627.
1Levy Leasing Co. v Siegal, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289;
Parks v Libby Owens-Ford Glass Co., 360 Ill. 130, 195 N. E. 616.
Onachevarria v Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 38 Sup. Ct. 323; Hygrade
Provision Company v Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 45 Sup. Ct. 141, Bandim
Petroleum Co. v Superior Ct., 284 U. S. 8, 52 Sup. Ct. 103; Connally v
General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 Sup. Ct. 126.
293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241.
295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837.
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of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority
to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.
"Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether Congress has
overstepped these limitations-whether Congress in authorizing 'codes
of fair competition' has itself established-the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, -or, by the
failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer -thatfunction
to others."
"Section 3 of the Recovery Act (15 U. S. C. A. 703) is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry, or, activity"
There are other cases involving commercial transactions which
illustrate the same point of view LO
Since the Schecter l i case has never been overruled, and since
the War Labor Disputes Act gives the WLB power to regulate

private business, a hasty generalization would bring the conelusion that the "fair and equitable" provision of the Act represents
an improper delegation of power. Such hasty generalization is,
however, unwarranted.

It

developments

thinking
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Panaina

in

legal

would fail to take cognizance of the
since
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Schechter 1 2

and

cases and of the existence of World War II.

In drawing up the War Labor Disputes Act, there is evidence

that Congress manifested an awareness of legal developments
since the Schechter 1 4 case in 1935. In limiting the application of

the War Labor Disputes Act to "labor disputes" which lead to
"substantial interference with the war effort,"

Congress has not

attempted to draw a statute designed to cover all of industry at
once. In so doing, Congress has avoided the irritation caused by
the National Industrial Recovery Act-the Act declared uncon-

stitutional by the Schechter1 5 case. Congress did not overlook
that the Court has approved delegation when the authority of ad"0See for example Carter v Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 288, 56
Sup. Ct. 855 involving regulation under Bituminous Coal Conservation Act; Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup.
Ct. 572, construing power of Federal Trade Commission; Gibson Auto
Co. v Finnegan, 217 Wisc. 401, 259 N. W 420, involving delegation
for emergency promotion of industrial recovery- In re State ex rel.
Attorney General, 220 Wis. 25, 264 N. W 633, involving Wisconsin
recovery act; Chas. Uhden v Greenough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 Pac.
(2d) 983, involving State of Washington Agricultural Adjustment Act;
Van Winkle v Fred Meyer, 151 Ore. 455, 49 Pac. (2d) 1140, involving
marketing agreement act.
Supra, note 9.
Supra, note 9.
"Supra, note 8.
' Supra, note 9.
11
Supra, note 9.
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ministration was confined to a relatively limited area. Congress
took heed of the precedenti-precedents, for example, which
established that, if agriculture was to be regulated, it was desir-able to provide in separate acts for soil conservation, price fixing
under marketing agreements, and the control of production, or
which disclosed that, in dealing with unfair labor practices, it was
wise to set up separate provisions dealing with unfair labor practices from wage-hour laws and enactments relating to trade practices. So, too, in formulating the War Labor Disputes Act, Congress has further shown an awareness that the Court, since 1935.
has indicated that it will avoid direct conflict with its holding in
the Schechterl0 case whenever it can find that discretion is conferred under a cloak of apparently detailed restriction, and, even
if the discretion is virtually unlimited. Nor did Congress forget
the technique it employed in connection with providing for marketing agreements which the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to secure under the A.A.A. The A.A.A. was set up to
contain a declaration of policy, which, briefly, was to establish
prices for farm products which would give them a purchasing
power with respect to articles that farmers buy which would be
equal to that of a "base period." 1 7 In order to "effectuate the
policies of the Act," the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized
but not required to enter into marketing agreements with the
producers of certain commodities, including milk.' s In the case
of milk, it was provided that, if the Secretary decides to impose a
marketing agreement, it shall contain one or more of a number
of terms indicated in the statute, including the classification of
milk and the imposition of uniform prices. 1 9 The agreements
were to be effective in such areas as are "practical."
Congress
recalled that the Court which unanimously refused to permit delegation to the President involved in the National Industrial Recovery Act was able to muster a majority in favor of permitting
the delegation just described. 20 It was asserted that the Secretary, unlike the President was limited in the exercise of his discretion by the enumeration of certain commodities to which the
"Supra, note 9.
52 Stat. 38, 7 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1301 (a) (1)
48 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C.A. Sec. 608 (c)
Ibid.
-'United States v Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533,
59 Sup. Ct. 993. See also the companion case of H. P Hood & Sons,
Inc. v United States, 307 U. S. 588, 59 Sup. Ct. 1019.
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statute was applicable. 2 1 Again Congress remembered its experience with the Securities and Exchange Act in which it had
granted many specifically enumerated powers to the Commission,
but had also in literally dozens of instances granted authority to
that body to make regulations which it "deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. "122
Proof of Congress' awareness of developments since the
Mciechter 2 3 case is apparent upon a breakdown of Section
7 (a) (2) (previously done in this article) of the War Labor Disputes Act. It is clear that there has been granted virtually unlimited discretion under a cloak of apparentl- detailed
restrictions.
The existence of World War II is the other element which
makes it impossible to come to the hasty conclusion that the principle of the Schechter 2 4 case makes the War Labor Disputes Act
unconstitutional. There is certainly more than a presumption
that the Court could see in the war power of Congress that which
would bring the War Labor Disputes Act into direct analogy with
cases involving health, morals, and safety, and those concerned
with business affected with a public interest It is much more than
a possibility that the Court could see in the existing war a situation which created the need for regulation under broad standards
-just as there is a need in the health, morals, and safety areas and
in those involving business affected with a public interest There
is substance for thought in the realization that virtually all
materials and activities are invested with prime public interest
and as such may be apt subjects of control during the emergency
of war. Such an outlook may be more appealing as it becomes
more and more apparent that modern conflicts are battles of
economies as well as armies.
There are, of course, arguments against the Court's acceptance of such a philosophy The chief argument is summed up in

I The dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts in the Hood case, supra, note
20, did not influence the majority Justice Roberts argued that there
was no substantial limitation on the Secretary's discretion in deciding
whether or not to impose marketing agreements in reference to certain
enumerated commodities.
2--See 36 Col. L.R. 974.
' Supra, note 9.
-"Supra, note 9.
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the Court's reasoning in the famous case of Ex ParteMilligan25
where the Court decided that
"The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally 7n war and in peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of
its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies
of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false,
for the government within the Constitution, has all the powers
granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence, as
has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw
off its authority "

Another argument is presented in United States v L. Cohen
Grocery Co.,20 which keeps almost a lone vigil in translating the
theory of Ex Parte Milligan into actual decision. 27 In the Cohen
case the Court held as too broad, a standard which made it "unlawful for any person wilfully to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with necessaries."
The Court remarked
"The decisions of this court indisputably establish that the
mere existence of a state of war could not suspend or change the
operation upon the power of Congress of the guarantees and limitations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (citing Ex ParteMilligan and other cases) It follows that in testing the operation of
the Constitution upon the subject here involved the question of
the existence or nonexistence of a state of war becomes negligible."

In spite of the arguments against the Court finding the
standards of the War Labor Disputes Act adequate, it seems to the
present writer that the Court would have no difficulty in working
out a theory to support the Act even though it is admitted that the
Constitution functions in wartime as well as in peacetime. The

way has been opened by a decision like CGilbert v Minnesota2s for
,the Court to point out that the war power of Congress justifies
some curtailmeilt of rights and privileges which would not be
permitted in peace time. In the Gilbert case the Court recognized
the relationship between civilian morale and victory in upholding
the curtailment of a teacher's freedom of speech in wartime. The
4 Wallace 2.
255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298.
In Hamilton v Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S.
161, 40 Sup. Ct. 106; and Highland Russell Car & Snowplow Co., 279
U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314, there appear noticeable symptoms that
war powers, as others, are subservient to constitutional restraints.
1251 U. S. 233, 41 Sup. Ct. 125
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Court could do the same thing in finding that labor unrest in wartime affects civilian needs and morale-and, indeed, military
needs and morale.
If the Court adopted such reasoning, it would have considerable support from various sources. In a Harvard Law Review
article, Labor Mobilization and the Constitutwn 29 It is stated
that the constitutionality of war legislation will probably depend
upon unpredictable extra judicial circumstances. Chief Justice
Hughes has remarked,3 0 "The power has been expressly given
to Congress to prosecute war, and to pass all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution.
That power explicitly conferred and absolutely essential to the
safety of the nation is not destroyed or impaired by any later
provisions of the Constitution or by any one of the Amendments.
These may all be construed so as to preserve the rights of citizens
from unwarranted attack, while assuring beyond all hazard the
common defense
The extraordinary circumstances of war
may bring particular businesses and enterprises clearly into the
category of those which are affected with a public interest and
which demand immediate public regulation."
In Block v
Hirsh,si Mr. Justice Holmes remarked "Plainly circumstances
may so change in time as to clothe with such a public interest what
at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely private concern." Professor Willoughby, in his famous work on the
Constitution, has pointed out that "the waging of war is essentially an exercise of police power, in which the end, in reasonable
cases, will justify the means." Judge Hough, in C. A. Weed &
Co. v Lockwood,3 2 has observed that war powers are superior to
police power and are not limited by such an analogy
Of course, it must be admitted that much of the reasoning
previously quoted would do no more than establish the right of the
WILB to regulate employer-employee relations in wartime. It
does not specifically support the conclusion that the delegation of
power to regulate private business can be made under loose standards. In spite of this fact, however, the writer feels that the
present Court will have such an awareness of the importance of
employer-employee relationships in wartime that it will sustain
54 Harv., L.R. 82.
' 42 A.B.A. Rep. 232, 241.
' 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458.
2266 Fed. 785.
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the loose standard in the War Labor Disputes Act. Loose standards have supported delegation against a background not nearly
as vital as that presented by a world conflagration.
INDEFINITENESS OF WAR LABOR DISPUTES ACT

Closely analogous to the question of the sufficiency of standards is the matter as to whether the War Labor Disputes Act is so
indefinite as to be unconstitutional.
On the topic of indefiniteness of a statute, Professor Horack,
in his very recent revision of Sutherland on Statuttory Construct1on, 33 has stated "There is no constitutional provision which
authorizes a court to declare an act invalid for uncertainty These
decisions (which have held acts invalid) appear to be unwarranted exercises of judicial power. No matter how difficult the
task may be a court should not escape its responsibility to inter
pret by declaring the act invalid." In State Ex rel Crow v. West
Side St. Ry. Co.,3 4 the Court remarked "It is the duty of courts
to endeavor by every rule of construction to ascertain the meaning
of and give full force and effect to the legislative product unless
it violates a specific constitutional prohibition."
Taking cognizance of Professor iHorack's statement and that
of the Court in the Crow case, it is possible to make a prediction
in respect to the Court's attitude on the issue of the indefiniteness
of the War Labor Disputes Act. In spite of the fact tbat the courts
have, on oceasion, 35 condemned statutes as indefinite, it is the
-writer's feeling that the same philosophy -will control which was
discussed at length in the section in this article on the sufficiency
of standards. If the Court can find the standards adequate, it will
have no difficulty in finding the War Labor Disputes Act sufficiently definite.
-ORDER OF CoinPULsoRy ARBITRATION As VIOLATION OP DUE PROCESS

It can be contended that an order of compulsory arbitration
impairs freedom of contract in violation of the due process clause.
Such a contention would doubtless be based -uponthe doctrine of
Third edition, section 4920.
"146 Mo. 155, 47 S.W 959.
"See Connally v General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46
Sup. Ct. 126; and United States v Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81,
41 Sup. Ct. 298.
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Chas. Wolff Packizg Co. v

Court of Inditstrial Relations of

Kansas.:3 6
Since the Wolff case is so important in substantiating such
position, it is appropriate to analyze it in some detail. The case
was a proceeding in mandamus to compel the Wolff Packing Co.
to put into effect an order of the Court of Industrial Relations
determining a dispute respecting wages, hours and working con-

ditions in a packing plant owned and operated by the Company
The order was made pursuant to the provisions of the Kansas
statute called the Industrial Relations Act. The Court described
the statute as follows
"The declared and adjudged purpose of the act is to insure continuity of operation and production in certain businesses which it calls
'essential industries. To that end it provides for the compulsory settlement by a state agency of all labor controversies in such businesses
which endanger the intended continuity It proceeds on the assumption
that the public has a paramount interest in the subject which justifies
the compulsion.
The state agency charged with the duty of making the settlement is the Court of Industrial Relations. Although called
a court, it is an administrative board. It is to summon the disputants
before it, to give them a hearing, to settle the matter in controversy
-as by fixing wages or hours of labor, where they are what is in dispute-to embody its findings and determination in an order, and, if
need be, to institute mandamus proceedings in the Supreme Court of
the state to compel compliance with its order.
"The following excerpt from the opinion of the Supreme Court
of the state m State ex rel. v Howat, 109 Kan. 375, 417, 198 P 686, 705,
(25 A. L. R. 1210) explains the pervading theory of the act:
'Heretofore the industrial relationship has been tacitly
regarded as existing between two members-industrial manager, and industrial worker. They have joined whole-heartedly in excluding others. The Legislature proceeded on the
theory there is a third member of those industrial relationships which have to do with production, preparation and distribution of the necessaries of life-the public. The Legislature
also proceeded on the theory the public is not a silent partner.
Whenever the dissensions of the other two become flagrant,
the third member may see to it the business does not stop.'
"On three occasions when the act was before us we referred to it
as undertaking to establish a system of 'compulsory' arbitration."

The Court reversed the judgment of the State Court, which had
awarded a writ of mandamus, and said.
"The system of compulsory arbitration which the Act establishes
is intended to compel, and if sustained will compel, the owner and
employees to continue the business on terms which are not of their
making. It will constrain them, not merely to respect the terms if they
continue the business, but will constrain them to continue the business
'267

U. S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct. 441.
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on those terms. True, the terms have some qualifications, but as shown
in the prior decision the qualifications are rather illusory and do not
subtract much from the duty imposed. Such a system infringes the
liberty of contract and rights of property guaranteed by the due process
of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

It is obvious that, if the Wolff case is still the law, and applies
to the situation of an order of compulsory arbitration under the
War Labor Disputes Act, there will be a violation of due process.
The Wolff case has never been expressly overruled by the Supreme
Court. It is still cited widely by commentators as holding that
private business (distinguished from business affected with a
public interest) cannot be compelled to settle disputes through
the technique of compulsory arbitration. On the feature of private business as distinguished from business affected with a public
interest the Wolff case is widely distinguished from Wilson v
7
New,3
where the Court sustained a form of compulsory arbitration which applied within the railroad industry
In the light of the writer's research on the problem, it certainly seems safe to state that the Wolff case is still the law unless the handling of labor disputes in wartsme changes the factual
background so that a court can come to the conclusion that it is
no longer dealing with the simple issue of control of private business, but rather is dealing with an issue of industry-labor relationship which should be subject to control for the public good.
For the philosophy underlying the general proposition that
the court might find a high degree of control of private business
valid in wartme because the public good demanded it, the reader
should review the section in this article on the sufficiency of
standards. What was said there by way of general philosophy
will be equally pertinent here.
In the cases themselves there are certain sign posts which may
point the way to a holding that the Wolff case does not bar compulsory arbitration under the War Labor Disputes Act. The most
important single indication is the statement of Justice Douglas
in Olsen v State of Nebraska,3 s in 1941. The case involved a
statute regulating maximum compensation to be charged by employment agencies. The Court, quoting from Nebbia v New
Yo4k 3 9 (milk price regulation case), remarked that such criteria
243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298.
313 U. S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct. 862.
291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505.
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(those used to determine whether business was affected with a
public interest) "are not susceptible of definition and form an
unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of legislation directed
at business practices or prices," and that "the phrase affected
with a public interest can mean no more than that an industry
for adequate reason is subject to control for the public good."
"In final analysis," the Court goes on, "the only constitutional
prohibition or restraints which respondents have suggested for
the invalidation of this legislation are those notions of public
policy embedded in earlier decisions of this Court, but which, as
Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the
Constitution. (Tyson & Brother v Banton, 47 Sup. Ct. at page
433, Adkins v Children's Hospital, 43 Sup. Ct. at page 405.)
Since they (the principles alluded to are those which base right
of liberty to contract on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which right was first expounded in the Adkrns case in which
Holmes wrote his dissent) do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot give them continuing vitality as standards by
which the constitutionality of economic and social programs of
the state are to be determined." The full import of Justice Douglas' opinion becomes more apparent when we look into Holmes'
dissent in the Tyson case, which is cited with approval by the
Court in the Olsen case. In the Tyson case Eolme-s said, "The
notion that a business is clothed with a public-interest and has
been devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended
to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers. The truth seems
to be that the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when
it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it." In the AdkIls
case, the other decision referred to by Justice Douglas, Holmes
remarked that the development of the Fifth Amendment had been
40
from an innocuous generality into liberty of contract.
If the Court is imbued with the philosophy which motivated
Justice Douglas in the Olsen case, it will find ready made for it
decisions to enable it to avoid the argument that an emergency
,oProfessor Hamilton, in an article entitled, Special Competence
of The Supreme Court, 50 Yale L. J. 1347, states that the court has
read liberty of contract out of the due process clause. He cites O'Gorman & Young v Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup.
Ct. 130. Professor Hamilton's statement is startling, even though
his citation in support of it seems none too forceful since the case
involves regulation of a fire insurance company See also, as approving
the philosophy of the Olsen case, Fleming v Montgomery Ward &
Co., 114 Fed. 384, certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 688, 61 Sup. Ct. 71.
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(war in this instance) does not give the legislature power to provide for settling of disputes by compulsory arbitration. As re41
cently as 1934, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v Blaisdall,
the Court said
"While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish
the occasion for the exercise of power. Although an emergency may
not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency
may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed-Wilson v New, 37 Sup. Ct. 298."

In addition to the remarks in the cases there exists in legal
literature statements which indicate that the present court may
hold compulsory arbitration to be no violation of due process. In
a leading article, 43 the pronouncement is made that "the court
has virtually eliminated due process as a bar to social legislation.
and during the past three terms no statute has been thrown out
on substantive due process grounds." In another article,4 4 the
author argues that there is great probability that a constitutional
warrant for federal compulsory arbitration in time of war might
be found in the war power.
An additional indication of the Court's outlook can be found
in the now rather commonly admitted philosophy of the Court
which is manifested in the conviction that the legislature, not the
judiciarv, is the competent agent to act in the social-economic
4
field. 5

At this point in the discussion, it will serve a useful purpose
to define liberty under the due process clause. As good a definition
as can be found appears in Meyer v State of Nebraska.4 6 The
Court states
"While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract,to engage m any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry establish
41290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231.

"To the same effect see Welch v Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 59 Sup.
Ct. 121.
" Umpire to the Federal System, 10 Univ of Chicago L.J. 27 (1942)
" Industrial Disputes m Time of War and Peace, 36 Ill. L.R. 290
(1942)
" State of Wisconsin v J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 61 Sup. Ct.
246; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkms, 310 U. S. 381, 60 Sup.
Ct. 907" Osborn v Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 60 Sup. Ct. 758; Mayo v Lakeland
Highland Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310, 60 Sup. Ct. 517.
" 262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625.
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a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. (Cases cited.) The established doctrine is that liberty
may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect."
Chief Justice Sydney Smith, of the Mississippi Supreme Court,
expressed the same thought in another way 47 He said.
"Due process means that government is without the right to deprive any person of life, liberty or property by an act that has no
reasonable relation to any government purpose, or which is so far
beyond the necessity of the case as to be an arbitrary exercise of
power."
The underlined sections of the definitions, when analyzed in the
light of a case like Olsen v State of Nebraska,4s indicate that the
connotation of due process can be manipulated to sustain compulsory arbitration. As a matter of fact, it might be well here to
recall a statement of Justice Frankfurter in a recent case to the
effect that a decision can represent a manipulation of words to
convey a preconceived idea. Justice Holmes said the same thing
years ago.
Some time back in this discussion, it was indicated that those
who see in compulsory arbitration a violation of due process would
find chief reliance in the Chas. Wolff Packing Co.4 9 case. There
is, however, another theory which can be used to sustain the
position of violation of due process by reason of an order of compulsory arbitration. A theory can be built upon the proposition
that there is a distinction between regulation and mana-ement
of a business, and the right of management is a property right
wich is within the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. There are
a number of cases which have decided that interference with the
right to manage going beyond what is necessary to protect health.
comfort, and safety is taking property without due process of
law 50 On the question of what is necessary, the courts have decreed that variations in conditions and circumstances will control.
The persuasiveness of such approach is not strong because
on the question of what is necessary the courts have decided that
variations in conditions and circumstances will control. Such in17 The Courts and Due Process of Law, 10 Miss
L.J. 1.
4
sSupra, note 38.
' Supra, note 36.
'An interesting analysis of the regulation versus management
situation appears at 13 Iowa L.R. 145.
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terpretation of what is necessary permits a court to apply the
philosophy of the Olsen case, and find that an order of compulsory
arbitration is not an illegal interference with management.
As concluding the discussion under this section, it is submitted that there appears to be more than a probability that the
court will sustain the compulsory arbitration order on the ground
that in wartime the industry-labor relationship should be subject
to control for the public good.
ORDER OF MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP

As

VIOLATION

OF DUE PROCESS

The principles which will determine the question raised by
this aivision appear to be exactly the same as those discussed under the section immediately proceeding.
MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP ORDERS As AFFECTING
DISCRIMINATION

A claim of discrimination can be based on the fact that an
order of maintenance of membership imposed on one concern and
not on another in a highly competitive field is a manifestation of
discrimination. The contention can be made that if a worker resigns from the union, a concern bound by a maintenance of membership order must discharge him regardless of his ability and
experience while if an employee resigns at an establishment not
so bound there is no similar requirement. Furthermore, it can be
presented that employees suffer from the same discriminatortreatment because workers are not free to resign from the union
without losing their jobs.
It would seem that the answer of the Court to such position
would depend to a large extent upon whether they find adequate
the standard, "to decide the dispute, and provide by order the
wages and hours and all other terms and conditions (customarily
and
included in collective-bargaining agreements)
provide for terms and conditions to govern relations between the
parties which shall be fair and equitable to employer and employee
under all the circumstances of the case." If the Court finds the
standard adequate, the way is open for them to follow the reasoning expressed in Currtn v Wallace.5 1 In that case, under the
306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379.
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Tobacco Inspection Act, the Secretary of Agriculture had authorized inspection at only three of the markets in North Carolina.
The warehousemen complained that the Act was discriminatory
on the ground that the warehousemen on other tobacco markets
in North Carolina, doing the same sort of business and competing
for patronage among the same growers, are at liberty to conduct sales in their warehouses without inspection and certificatidn.
In answering the complaint, the Court remarked
If it be assumed that
"The reason for the selection is shown "
there might be discrimination of such an injurious character as to bring
into operation the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that is a
different matter from a contention that mere lack of uniformity in
the exercise of the commerce power renders the action of Congress
invalid. For that contention we find no warrant. It is of the essence of
the plenary power conferred that Congress may exercise its discretion in the use of power. Congress may choose the commodities
and places to which its regulation shall apply Congress may consider
and weigh relative situations and needs. Congress is not restricted
by any technical requirement but may make limited applications
and resort to tests so that it may have the benefit of experience in
deciding upon the continuance or extension of a policy which under
the Constitution it is free to adopt. As to such choices, the question is
one of wisdom and not of power."
The Fourth Circuit, in deciding the identical case, 53 came to the
same conclusion in spite of its statement that
"It is true that arbitrary discrimination between
persons in similar circumstances would violate the
due process clause."

The pronouncement of Justice Frankfurter, in Railroad
(JommiZsson v Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.,54 to the effect that courts

must not substitute their notions of expediency and fairness for
those which have guided the agencies to whom the formulation
and execution of policy have been intrusted, is another indication of the theory that may guide the Court. True it is that the
language appeared in an oil proration case, and may be confined
to such factual situation. However, the really significant element
in the case appears to be the fact that there was discrimination of
an arbitrary sort.
'The Act provides that in case competent inspectors are not
available or for other reasons the Secretary is unable to provide for
such inspection and certification at all auction markets within a
type area, he shall first designate those markets where the greatest
number of growers may be served with the facilities available.
95 Fed. (2d) 856.
310 U. S. 573, 60 Sup. Ct. 1021.
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It is certain that some very apparent distinctions can be
drawn between the Tobacco Inspection Act and the War Labor
Disputes Act. In the former Act the statute itself gave the Secretary authority to make a selection as to what markets at which to
start the inspection, and set forth some criteria for a guide to determination. The latter Act contains no such clear pronouncements. Nevertheless, the War Labor Disputes Act does say that
the Board is to act "to decide the dispute whenever the United
States Conciliation Service certifies that a labor dispute exists
which may lead to substantial interference with the war effort,
and cannot be settled by collective bargaining or conciliation."
Provided the WLB conforms to the wording of the Act just
quoted, it appears that the Court could find, as it did m the Currin
case, that "the reason for the selection is shown." It is quite probable that as far as regulation in the labor-industry field is concerned the Court will find the directive of Congress, on the point
of when the WLB should take up a controversy, as sufficiently
clear, and as constituting the only realistic directive that could be
set forth.
It follows from what has been already indicated that discrimination could be established if it was proved that the United
States Conciliation Service or the WLB had acted arbitrarily and
not in accordance with the Act. The WLB could also be found
guilty of discrimination if, in deciding the dispute, it proceeded in
an arbitrary fashion. As to what would constitute arbitrary action
in arriving at a decision would depend upon the Board's acts and
orders. In conclusion it is submitted that, if the Court sustains
the delegation of power to the WLB, it will be necessary to show
a strong case of arbitrary action before the Court will find discriinmation.
ORDER OF MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSUIlP AS VIOLATING

THE NATIONAl, LABOR RELATIONS ACT

The controversy over whether the WLB can order maintenance
of membership rages over the interpretation to be placed upon the
phraseology of Section 8 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
which provides as follows
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer:By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage

.1DUNTENNANOE OF MEi3FERSi iP-N.L.R. ACT
membership m any labor organization: Provided, that nothing in this
Act
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees, as provided in Section
9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such
agreement when made."

It is contended that the existence of Section 8(3) prohibits
the issuing of an order of maintenance of membership since the
section speaks only of the closed-sk op when voluntarily agreed to
by the employer. This contention arises out of the provision in

the War Labor Disputes Act which states that the WLB must
conform to provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.55

As to whether Section 8 (3) prohibits an agreement for maintenance of membership, the best reasoning on both sides can be
found in the argument of Mr. Watts, General Counsel for the
National Labor Relations Board, and that of The National Association of Manufacturers.
Mr. Watts argues, as follows, that Section 8 (3) does not prohibit the agreement for maintenance of membership -56
"While the closed shop provision is more severe than the maintenance of membership, both fall within the terms of the proviso
since they 'require as a condition of employment membership' m the
contracting union.
There is no reason to believe that Congress
intended the proviso of Section 8(3) to protect only one species of
agreement requiring as a condition of employment membership, in
a contracting labor organization. -,
The argument of The National Association of Manufacturers n s runs, as follows, to the contrarv
They submit that, while
maintenance of membership may not be illegal per se, it will
lead to unfair labor practice in the event that it becomes iieces-

sary for an employer to discharge employees because they have
changed their union affiliation.

They base their reasoning upon
v
Waterman Steamship

their understanding that N.L.R.B

Corp.5' states the rule that in the absence of a closed shop agreement it is an unfair labor practice to discharge employees because they change their union affiliation.
:. Section 7 (a) (2)
"9 L.R.R. 81.
Isthmian Steamship Co. and Nat'l Maritime Union of America,
22 N.L.R.B. 689 and Peninsular and Occidential Shipping Co. v
N.L.R.B., 98 Fed. (2d) 411, cert. den'd 305 653, both cases involving
preferential employment contracts.
S9 L.R.R. 137.
309 U. S. 206, 60 Sup. Ct. 493.
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The view of Mr. Watts seems much more logical than that
of the NAMl. The NAM interpretation of the Waterman case is
not warranted. The Waterman decision is based upon the Court's
finding that under the terms of the .contract, as made by the parties, no vacancies had occurred, and hence discharges were unfair.
There seems to be no sound theory in support of the proposition
that the proviso of Section 8(3), while approving a closed shop
agreement, would frown upon a contractual arrangement whidh
was less severe than the closed shop. In N.L.R.B v Electrw
Vacuum Cleaner Co.,60 the Court placed a broad construction on
the closed shop provision of Section 8(3), and held that it was
not limited to the "usual closed shop." The Court found that the
proviso would include a type of contract where older employees
are exempt from the requirement of joining the Union. 6 1
It is submitted, therefore, that maintenance of membership,
as such, is not prohibited under the National Labor Relations Act.
It is another question as to whether the WLB can order maintenance of membership, or whether the phrase "the employer is
not precluded" means that such order is a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. In analyzing such question it seems
necessary to recall that one main objective of the National Labor
Relations Act was to protect the employee against unfair labor
practices on the part of the employer. One purpose for inserting
the proviso of Section 8 (3) was to make clear that, if the employer
grants a closed shop to a properly designated majority umon, he
does not commit an unfair labor practice. Such intent is apparent
from the use of the phrase, "the employer is not precluded."
Since, therefore, the granting by the employer of a closed shop
or maintenance of membership contract is not an unfair labor
practice, it follows that, when the WLB orders maintenance of
membership, it is not commanding the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act. Under the basic assumption that the union was unassisted
by the employer and properly designated,it is difficult to see how
a governmental order of maintenance of membership would make
the employer participate in an unfair labor practice. To arrive at
1120 Fed. (2d) 611.
" The Vacuum Cleaner case was reversed in 315 U. S. 685, 62 Sup.
Ct. 846, but there is nothing to indicate that the Supreme Court
found fault with the statement that the court would place a broad
construction on the closed shop provision of Section 8 (3)
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a different conclusion would be to give an unrealistically strict
interpretation to the language of the proviso of Section 8(3) A
strict interpretation would doubtless be in conflict with what is
likely to be the Court's attitude toward the War Labor Disputes
Act.
Such reasomng leads to the conclusion that since a maintenance of membership contract is not per se an indication of an
unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, it
would appear that when the process of collective bargaining breaks
down, the WLB could step in and order a maintenance contract.
Such seems to be permissible under a literal interpretation of the
language of Section 7 (a) (1) and (2) of the War Labor Disputes
Act. The WLB is authorized to act when a labor dispute exists
which "cannot be settled by collective bargaining or conciliation." Viewed in such perspective the Disputes Act would certainly justify the WLB in taking action which the National Labor
Relations Board could not take. The true meaning of the provision that the WLB cannot issue an order in conflict with Section 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act seems to be that
the Board could not order an employee to commit an unfair labor
practice. And, as previously indicated, the WLB is not making
any such order when it decrees maintenance of membership.
There may, however, be one argument which destroys the
soundness of such reasoning. In the debate on the War Labor
Disputes bill in Congress there was an interchange of language
between Mr. Marcantonio, from New York, and Mr. Smith, from
Virginia (one of the sponsors of the bill), which could be interpreted by the Court as showing the intent of Congress that
the WLB should not have authority to issue maintenance of
membership orders. The language referred to is here presented.
Mr Marcantomo.
Mr. Speaker, I call the attention of the House to the history of
a very vicious provision which the House, in Committee of the Whole,
took out of the original May bill, which the gentleman from Virginia
took out of his own amendment to the Harness substitute and which
has now been put back again in this conference report. By the use
of different language the same purpose is being accomplished.
When the original May bill was reported out of committee, it
provided that the War Labor Board could not direct any worker to
become a member or remain a member of any union. I pointed out
that this might mean the end of the closed shop and might mean the
end of the union maintenance clauses in the various contracts now in
existence. This I did before the Committee on Rules.
' Congressional Record, Vol. 89, No. 107, page 5781.
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Subsequently the Committee on Military Affairs met and recommended a committee amendment striking out that langauge, so that
it would then be possible for the War Labor Board to continue union
maintenance, the union shop, and the closed shop wherever they
existed, because it was recognized that to do otherwise, to deprive the
War Labor Board of the power to direct the union maintenance, the
union shop, and the closed shop, would bring about anarchy and
chaos in war industries. So the Committee on Military Affairs had
an amendment prepared taking out that langauge.
Then the Harness substitute was offered and the Harness substitute omitted that language. At the time that a deal was entered intowe may as well speak frankly here, because labor is being pilloried
and lynched-when a deal was entered into between those who were
supporting the Harness substitute and the forces that were supporting
the Smith amendment to the Harness substitute, the gentleman from
Indiana and others were opposed to having that particular language
in the bill. Thus the astute gentleman from Virginia who had put that
language again in his amendment to the Harness substitute, because of
the insistence of many of you who were ready to vote for the bill without
that language, submitted a unanimous-consent request to withdraw
that language, to eliminate it, but objection was made. Then the gentleman from Virginia went so far as to offer an amendment to his amendment striking out that language, and this amendment was carried.
Therefore, when the bill went to conference, the language prohibiting
the War Labor Board to order continuance of the closed union shop
and union maintenance did not exist m this bill.
Now, we find this prohibition back again in this conference report,
and I shall show you how they did it. I call attention to page 4 of
the conference report, subdivision 2, which states as follows:
In making any such decision the Board shall conform to the
provisions of the Fair Labors Standards Act of 1938, as amended;
the National Labor Relations Act; etc.
What do they mean by that? The gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Smith) very well knows that in dealing with a situation under the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board is
dealing with just two problems: One, the right to organize, and, two, the
right of the worker to choose his agent for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
The National Labor Relations Board cannot direct a
closed shop, a union shop, or union-maintenance clause. Therefore,
by inserting this clause you are now forbidding the War Labor Board
to order a closed shop, union shop, or union-maintenance shop. I have
explained this involved manipulation so that when you vote for this
conference report you will know what you are doing, and I challenge
anybody to deny that you are not voting to prohibit the War Labor
Board from directing the continuance of a closed shop, union shop,
or union-maintenance agreements
and I ask you to vote down
this report.
Mr Smith.y
I want to say a word about the statement made by the gentleman
from New York who speaks the voice of the American Labor Party
as to the insertion in this bill of the language that this agency the
War Labor Board, must conform to the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act. The fact is that when I offered my amendment in
the first instance that language was in the amendment; was even read
in full to the House because someone objected to the unammousconsent request that the reading be dispensed with. When I changed
the amendment and offered it again, that language was still there, and
Congressional Record, Vol. 89, No. 107, page 5786.
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it was again read in full in the House and it was printed in the Record
that night. Everybody had an opportunity to read it the next morning,
and if they did not know it was in there it was their own fault. The
Executive order did not change the National Labor Relations Act.
Does the gentleman from New York intend to quarrel with me because
I refer to the National Labor Relations Act? Does he contend that the
War Labor Board should not be required to comply with that act, as
well as every other act of Congress?
Why is that clause in there? It is in there because the very
Executive order which created the War Labor Board contained the
same language
As to whether it cuts out the closed shop I agree with the gentleman from New York. I do not see how the War Labor Board ever got
any power to order any company to enter into an agreement which
they did not agree to. I say now-and I have said this repeatedlythat maintenance of union orders of the War Labor Board are in conflict with the express provisions of the National Labor Relations Act,
and a direct violation of the clear provisions of that statute, and I
think it clear, from the provision of the bill, that this House, by
adopting the bill and the conference report, means to so instruct the
War Labor Board.
At another point Senator Austin, of Vermont, stated:64
"Thereupon the two paragraphs (1) and (2) (of Section 7)
occur. In these two paragraphs the emphasis of the policy of the
Congress is again laid upon the law" and the obligation is imposed
upon the Board as follows:
"In making any such decision the Board shall conform to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended.
"Let me divert from the text long enough to say that one important point in that connection is that under the Fair Labor Standards
Act there is a limitation upon the Board that it shall not have the
power to impose a closed shop or an open shop or any kind of a shop
upon any industry"
(Apparently "Fair Labor Standards Act" in the above quotation
should be "National Labor Relations Act.")
The quotations from the Congressional Record throw considerable doubt upon the Court's final reaction to the validity of
maintenance of membership orders. The present writer feels that
the Court will want to sustain the WLB orders. In doing so, the
Court nght take heed of another remark made before Congress
in answer to M'r. Marcantonio. Mr. Thomason stated 65 "1 might

say in answer to the gentleman from New York, that the language
to winch he refers adopts exactly the same language that the

President put in his Executive order establishing the War Labor
Board when he said in the middle of subsection 2 of Section 7
making any such decision the Board shall conform to
National Labor Relations Act.' "

'In
the

It cannot be forgotten that the

President has upheld the WLB in providing for maintenance of

membership.
Congressional Record, Vol. 89, No. 107, page 5831.
Congressional Record, Vol. 89, No. 107, pp. 5783-4.
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PREDETERMINATION ON IsSUE OF MEMBERSHIP-MAINTENANCE

As

CONSTITUTING BIAS ON PART OF WAR LAROIu

BOARD

IN- VIOLATION OF FAIR HEARING REQUIREMENTS AND

DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS

Despite efforts through statements of the type made by
Wayne Morse in the CaterpillarTractorcase 6 6 that it is "impossible to devise any one pat formula or union maintenance clause
that can be applied uniformly as a policy pattern in each and
every case," it is quite obvious and clearly revealed by research
that the War Labor Board has established the pattern of membership-maintenance with the 15-day escape clause, the good
standing clause and the no coercion clause, and at least the voluntary check-off if the union is worthy and responsible and requests membership-maintenance or some stronger form of umon
security
It is possible to trace this development in War Labor Board
thinking. There are definite indications which point the way to
the conclusion above set forth.
By June 11, 1942, the War Labor Board had worked out a
form of maintenance of membership which, through the inclusion
of the 15-day escape clause, was able to draw temporary support
from the employer members of the Board in the Ryan Aeronautical
Company and United Automobile Workers (C. I. 0.)67 case. It
is noteworthy that in the CaterpillarTractor0 s case, Dean Morse
stated that, "the public members gave weight to the fact that it
would be highly desirable if the Board could reach a unammous
point of view on the issue of union security " By August 6, 1942,
Dean Morse's hope had become a reality, for in the S. A. Woods
Machine Co.69 and Borg-Warner Corp.7° cases the WLB made an
end of the cleavage through the expressed belief that constant emphasis on disagreement could serve no useful purpose in this
critical period. It is true the employer members reserved their
rights to reverse or revise their position
particularly when
they think because of some special facts that the public interest
would not be served by granting maintenance of membership.
10 L.R.R. 43.
" National War Labor Board case No. 46. Also see E-Z Mills and
second Phelps Dodge decisions of June 26, 1942.
'Supra,
note 66.
10 L.R.R. 793.
10 L.R.R. 795.
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Since August 6, 1942, various arguments have been set forth
by the Board in justification of maintenance of membership which
indicate the attempt of the employer members to function within
their expressed reservation indicated above. The arguments set
forth have been such as (1) offsetting an environment hostile to
the bargaining union, due to community opinion, employer's conduct, or militancy of a rival union, and (2) confirming a record
of stability, fairness and responsibility of the bargaining union
(e. g., that this is not the first contract between employer and
Union)
In spite, however, of such expressed reasons, the only positive reason given in some of the Board's best considered declarations is the general one that is set forth in the following passage
from the Board's opinion (per Graham) in the CaterpillarTractor
case
"This maintenance of union membership on the part of those who
receive the choice to be bound by it, is simply an equitable consideration of the union's giving up the right to strike for the union and
closed shop. By and large this maintenance of a stable union membership makes for the maintenance of a responsible union leadership,
the maintenance of loyal union discipline, and the maintenance of
maximum production for winning the war."

This very same policy of the _WLB is well expressed by Wayne
Mlorse, public member on the Board, in an address on September
71
17, 1942, before the Federal Bar Association, Washington, D. C.
It is stated by Mr.Morse
"All our study and deliberation convinced us that a strong, responsible and properly operated union would aid production. When
the fear of anti-union activity is removed, there is then a proper basis
for harmony, and intelligent cooperation between union and management.
"In seeking a solution to this problem the Board was presented
with two extremes: the open shop on one side, the closed shop on the
other. The formula of maintenance of membership worked out by the

Board is an admitted compromise and in the Board's opinion represents a reasonable sacrifice by both parties with a maximum of benefit
accruing to the general public.
"The Board sought a solution that would protect the union and
its members from the weakening effect of the no-strike agreement and
without penalizing the employer.
"Finally, after much travail and care, the Board adopted the
so-called maintenance of membership formula which in its present
form provides (the standard form is quoted)
"This formula the Board feels provides an orderly and peaceful
method of settling the question of union security"
N.W.L.B. Unpublished Release.
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Other very significant statements have been made wnch indicate that the WLB grants maintenance of membership as a
pattern whenever union security is requested. In a N.W.L.B.
Unpublished Release of July 16, 1942, Roger D Lapham, emplover member of the Board, is quoted as saying
"The concern of the public members of the Board has been for the
formula by which maintenance of membership is to be required rather
than the question of whether union security should be granted in any

case."

An even more significant utterance is that of Chairman
Davis of the Board, in an unpublished address delivered before
the American Arbitration Association in New York on November
2.3, 1942. Mr. Davis there advised unions to shift their objective
in negotiation from wages and union security, because these issues
are settled, to such topics of labor peace as grievances, seniority,
training programs, accidents, discharges, and means to increase
production.
The cases, too, have pointed the way to Board attitude. Early
in 1943 the Board indicated that it had adopted a policy of granting maintenance of membership wherever there are no positive
reasons against it. In Atlas Powder Co. and Intemiational Unon
of Mi ie, Mill & Smelter Workers (C. I. 0 ),72 the Board said
"The Board awards its standard membership-maintenance clause,
adopting the report of the mediation officer, which declares:

'Since the present War Labor Board policy appears to be to

grant union security unless some definite reason can be shown for

denying the union request, it is recommended that the Board
order the standard maintenance of membership clause, with the
15-day withdrawal period. No evidence of irresponsibility was
presented to form any basis for an adverse recommendation on
this point. Indeed the company specifically states that relations
with the union have been satisfactory and harmornous. "
In the lational CarbonCo.73 case, the Board said that "maintenance of membership should be included in the contract between
the parties in view of the Board's established policy " In Harshaw
Chemzcal Co.,74 maintenance of membership was granted as a
device to strengthen the union. In World Bestos Brake Limng
Corp.,7 5 the Board ordered maintenance of membership in order
to prevent needless conflict even though no conflict had been
7 11 L.R.R. 560.
11 L.R.R. 750, January 23, 1943.
"12 L.R.R. 104, March 17, 1943.
"March 27, 1943.
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claimed. In Transue &l Williams Steel Forging Co.,7 6 the Board
granted maintenance of membership because it stated that the
company had advanced no facts which would justify denial of a
standard maintenance of membership clause.
Since, therefore, it is now settled that maintenance of memberslup is almost certainly to be awarded when asked for, unless
the union is irresponsible or not "operated according to certain
well established democratic principles, "7- it remains to analyze
the situation to determine if the Board's approach amounts to
the predetermination of an issue, and, consequently, a violation
of fair hearing and due process requirements.
Section 7 (a) (2) of the War Labor Disputes Act gives the
WLB authority to decide disputes. Section 7 (a) (1) of the War
Labor Disputes Act requires that the Board give fRll notice and
opportunity to be heard. This latter requirement when viewed
against the standards set up as guides to help the Board decide
the dispute, especially that standard which requires that the
Board shall "provide for terms and conditions
which shall be
fair and equitable to the employer and employee under all the
circimstarces of the case," indicates the need for a decision on
the merits in each case. A need is disclosed for a full and fair
hearing of the type to be hereafter discussed.
NOTICr AND HEARING U-NDER W AR LABOR DIsPuTEs ACT
DEMANDS OF PROCEDURAL

DUE PROCESS

In previous sections of this treatise the writer has indicated
that the Court may construe the constitution so as to sustain the
apparently unlimited delegation under the War Labor Disputes
Act. So, too, it has been pointed out that the court is unlikely to
find a violation of substantive due process.
In the face of such probable reaction of the Court, it seems
pertinent to discuss the War Labor Disputes Act from the viewpoint of procedural due process.
An inspection of Section 7 (a) (1) of the Disputes Act reveals that the Act is not silent on the matter of hearing. It is
there stated.
"May 14, 1943.

-

.

The quotation is from the statement of Chairman Davis in the
S.A. Woods case, supra, note 69.
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"Whenever the United States Conciliation Service certifies that
a labor dispute exists
the Board shall conduct a public hearing on
the merit of the dispute
At such hearing both parties shall be given
"
full notice and opportunity to be heard.

Such language in statutes has frequently been construed to
give parties a right to an opportunity for a quasi-judicial hearing.
Before coming to such final conclusion, however, it is necessary
to analyze the connotation of the phrase "opportunity to be
heard. "
Professor Davis, in an article entitled, Reqzuremevt of Opportunity To Be Heard in the Admznistratzve Process,7s defines
the term as meaning either (1) a chance to present argument at
a public meeting or (2) an opportunity for a trial resembling
that of a courtroom. If such definition is accepted it becomes
vitally necessary to determine whether a hearing of type one or
two should be given under the War Labor Disputes Act. An
answer can come from an analysis of various factors of background.-Fundamentally, the solution to the problem is intensely
practical. The solution would seem to lie in analyzing the materials needed in the various proceedings, and ascertaining what
means will best assure enlightened action that will take into
account what the parties have to offer by way of information,
persuasion and testing.
Such solution has for the most part been ignored by the
courts. They have couched their decisions in different terms. It is
necessary to view the work of the courts in this regard. Manv
times the courts have applied a separation of powers classification
as criteria for the type of hearing. A reading of many a judicial
opinion would lead to the conclusion that the trial technique is
needed for "judicial" action, but not necessarily for "legislative." The difficulty, however, of drawing such a line is great.

What Holmes said in Prentis v Atlantic Coast Line Co.7 0 is in
point on the matter of the difficulty of drawing the line. In some
instances Fuchs' "rule making" rule is easier to interpret m
order to come to the conclusion that the trial type of hearing is
not necessary in rule makingsituations. But even such rule is not
a perfect criteria. Often the situation is analyzed from the viewpoint of tradition. The test then will be whether the agency is to
"51 Yale L.J. 1093 (1942)
'211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67.
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do what the legislature usually does, or what the court usually
does. 0
Still other tests have been used to determine the kind of
hearing necessary Cases are legion which assert that privileges s l
may be taken away without opportunity for a judicial type of
hearing, but that property rights are protected by a due process
hearing.
It is possible to go through the cases and tabulate innuiuer
able instances of necessity for immediate action, where haste must
supplant other considerations. This is particularly true in the
area of food regulation.
If we are to apply the traditional tests discussed in the paragraphs above, the conclusion seems inevitable that a hearing before the WLB takes on the aspects of a quasi-judicial proceeding
rather than a quasi-legislative proceeding. The type of activity
carried on and tradition would dictate such outcome. Certainly
no privilege is involved. The best argument against a quasijudicial hearing appears to be the need for haste in deciding
labor disputes in wartime. However, inasmuch as the-War Labor
Disputes Act sets up safeguards against the hurried calling of a
strike, and because of the speeding up which can result from the
use of Regional War Labor Board panels, it seems that haste need
not dictate the abandonment of a quasi-judicial hearing.
But it has been suggested previously-in line with the philosophy of many forward thinkers about administrative lawthat the most practical solution to the determination of what
constitutes a proper hearing lies in analyzing the materials needed
in the various proceedings, and ascertaining what means will best
assure enlightened action that will take into account what the
parties have to offer by way of information, persuasion and testIng.
The discussions will now analyze the application of such
theory In rate cases the principal facts relate to the valuation
of the company's property No one is in a better position than
the company to offer affirmative proof and helpful crossexamination and rebuttal. The valuation facts peculiarly concern
I See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S.
294, 53 Sup. Ct. 350.

' Auto licenses, dance hall licenses, pool room licenses, liquor
licenses, milk dealer licenses, and lobster fisher licenses.
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i.dividual parties. Another situation is presented by an inquirv
into general economic facts, largely susceptible of statistical
analysis and presentation. As a basis for issuing drders when the
latter situation exists, informal investigation and research will
do-with possible use of questionnaires, written reports, publislied materials, interviews, and conferences. The real controversy will lie in the interpretation of facts, exercise of discretion
and formulation of policy Such questions do not call for proof.
Although a trial is an unsurpassed device for dealing with conflicting evidence, for determining what evidence is to be believed,
and what evidence is to be disregarded, and for testing, through
cross-examiiation and through rebuttal evidence, the veracity
memory, perception, and narration of witnesses, an inquirv into
general economic and statistical information seldom requires that
process. This is not to say that safeguards to private parties
should not be provided. Oral and written argument should be
allowed. Officials should present their -view and be given the
opportunity to argue. For example, it may be absolutely necessary to use the trial technique in certain phases of price fixing.
It would seem to be indispensable when specific facts are in dispute. There is, of course, no reason why an entire proceeding needs
to follow the same method throughout.
Such reasoning leads back to the discussion of the type of
hearing which should be accorded by the WLB. In the area of
labor relations there is bound to be dispute over facts. Individual
concerns are involved. Good practice, therefore, would seem to
dictate a formal hearing8 2 on the disputed issues. Economic facts
not subject to dispute could be admitted without formal hearing
provided the adverse parties had knowledge of and opportunity
to study any economic facts which the WLB treats as evidence.
On the assumption that a formal hearing would best serve
justice, it seems proper to look into the Courts' requirement as to
' It is. interesting to note, however, that one author, Professor
Davis, in 51 Yale L.J. 1093 (1943), feels that the procedure before
the National Defense Mediation Board satisfied due process. He remarked, "The represented character of the -Board, the informal hearings in which mixtures of facts and argument were freely presented
and the predominant purpose to effect settlements through negotiation
and bargaining combine to provide a system far superior to an orthodox trial." The different function of the War Labor Board would seem
to change the situation.
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such hearings. In the New EBiglard Divisions case,sS the Court
stated
"A full hearing is one in which ample opportunity is afforded to
all parties to make by evidence and argument, a showing fairly adequate to establish the propriety or impropriety
from the standpoint
of justice and law, of the step to be taken. ''s'
The second Morgan case s5 laid down the rule that a party
entitled to a hearing is entitled thereby to know the contentions
of his opponents and to meet them. The Court, in Interstate
Commerce Comnission v Louisville & Nashville R. R.,S stated
"The statute gave the right to a full hearing, and that conferred
the privilege of introducing testimony and at the same time imposed
the duty of deciding in accordance with the facts proved. A finding
without evidence is arbitrary"
The arguments supporting, and the theory behind, the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses indicate that no hearing is adequate which does not entitle a party to be informed of his opponent's contention. In Farmers' Elevator Co. v Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. R. R.,s7 a state public utility commission sought
to compel construction of certain railroad connections. The commission based its decision on investigation. The Court said
"Allowing the testimony to be heard by the commission without
opportunity to cross-examine the witness presenting it, amounts to a
practical denial of the vital part of the hearing required by statute."
In the same vein the Court, in the Louisvfle & Nashvilles s case
remarked.
"All parties must be fully appraised of the evidence submitted
or to be considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence to explain or in
rebuttal."
As a corollary to fair hearing requirements it is established
law that it is necessary for a board to set forth basic findings
upon which a decision is based.
By way of conclusion it is submitted that procedural due
process calls for the WLB to safeguard affected interests by taking into account both information and persuasion which those
Z8261 U. S. 184, 43 Sup. Ct. 270.
" To the same effect, see Landoner v City and County of Denver,
210 U. S. 373, 28 Sup. Ct. 708.
304 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 773.
227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185.
107 N.E. 841, 266 Ill. 567.
s Supra, note 86.
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interests can supply, and by subjecting the materials on which
the agency acts to the parties' testing process.
There appear to be still other requirements placed upon
the WLB by the demands of procedural due process. Even though
it be held that a Board order of compulsory arbitration does not
violate substantive due process, it appears incumbent upon the
WLB to set up standards to guide the arbitrator. A failure to
make such provision would seem to result in the grant of unlimited discretion, and to not accord procedural due process.
Another requirement of procedural due process would dictate
that the WLB needs to make basic findings in order to establish
its jurisdiction under the War Labor Disputes Act.
If the Court agrees with what has been said about procedural
due process, it is possible to state that the Court should condemn
present WLB procedure as a violation of procedural due process.
War Labor Board hearings have been too informal, and there
has been no care to make valid basic findings.
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